We analyze the contribution of production factors to revenue growth in almost the complete universe of U.S. hospitals, accounting for quality and productivity. Production factors (capital, labor, energy, materials and drugs) contributed 70% (drugs alone contributed 52%), better health outcomes (higher quality) contributed 5%, and better use of resources (productivity) contributed 25%. We find increasing returns to scale, a markup of between 15% and 36% and a much larger productivity dispersion in the hospital sector than the one found in manufacturing, with gains coming mainly from within-hospital productivity growth and almost zero coming from net entry.
literature, such machine would be counted as technology but in the macroeconomic or industrial organization literature, it would be counted as capital. The technology component of the MRI machine, if any, would be the possibility of delivering a more precise diagnosis with fewer resources (i.e. fewer physical exams). More precise diagnosis would represent the gains in quality from the new technology. The productivity component would be the way that a hospital is able to use the potential gains of the new machine to deliver those diagnosis with fewer resources.
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In this paper, we estimate the productivity at the hospital level of the universe of U.S. Medicare-certified institutional providers, which correspond to 95% of U.S. hospitals. Specifically, our measure of productivity is the residual of a hospital production function estimated at the micro level, with medical services as the measure of output. We decompose this term in true productivity and quality, controlling for prices.
We measure the productivity of hospitals in terms of the medical services they deliver and not in terms of health outcomes, which are considered in our quality measures. Triplett (2013) characterizes the measurement of productivity in health systems in two ways, depending on how output is defined. The first measures output as the medical services that depend on inputs like capital, labor, energy and drugs. In this case, productivity change is given by the growth of medical services when the production inputs change. The second measures health as the outcome. In this case, a partial measure of productivity can be calculated as the change in health given by a change in medical care, or, alternatively, as the change in health given by the change in the inputs used to produce medical care. This measure is the "productivity of the medical care resources used to improve health". This is a partial productivity measure because health depends on many other factors different from medical services. In order to measure the productivity of medical services to produce health, we would have to account for all the determinants of health to isolate the specific spending on medical services, this is, genetics, exercise, diet, lifestyle, etc. McKeown (1976) documents that most long term improvements in health can not be accounted for by medical interventions, and Ford (2007) shows that only 46.6 percent of the decline in US deaths from coronary disease between 1980 and 5 We will call this term "True Productivity" in the rest of the paper.
2000 is accounted for medical/surgical treatments. Explanations of the lack of cross sectional correlation between spending and outcomes in the U.S. health care system consider the production function of health as starting point. Instead, we estimate the production function of medical services, allowing for the possibility of an efficient system in delivering medical services. In this way we can be agnostic about the productive efficiency of the delivery of health.
To illustrate our output measure, and the analysis of the production factors, productivity and quality involved in the hospital sector, consider again the example of the MRI machine. Suppose that a given hospital buys this machine to be used in the process of breast cancer diagnosis. In this example, the medical services that the hospital provides are the MRI exam itself, the diagnosis, any additional necessary exams and the different treatments that doctors apply to the patient, like radiation and chemotherapy. All those would be our measured outputs. Our inputs would be the hours spent by doctors and nurses in this example, the drugs administered to the patient, the capital involved in the diagnosis and treatment, which includes the MRI machine, the energy spent by the hospital and the medical supplies needed for the diagnosis and treatment. Our quality measure would account for the amount of days the person survives after the treatment is administered, and our productivity measure would account for the amount of services the hospital was able to provide given a certain amount of resources. Our measure of quality (survival days after treatment) could also be used also as a measure of output. However, in this case we would have to account for all the determinants of health to isolate the specific spending on medical services, this is, genetics, exercise, diet, lifestyle, etc. and the productivity concept would be different, as Triplet (2013) discussed.
To separate the effect of hospital-level prices from the productivity growth, we use the method proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996) , which introduces a demand system to account for unobservable prices at the individual level. Estimating productivity of hospitals also requires a careful treatment of the prices that are charged to consumers, since an increase in medical expenditure can reflect an increase in price, an increase in health output or an increase in the amount of services provided by the hospital, the last two being true indicators of productivity.
To control for the endogeneity of productivity and input choices, we use the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) , which exploits the fact that investment choices are the result of a dynamic decision wherein productivity is a state variable, such that the unobserved productivity can be recovered as an inverse function of the observed investment choices. 6 We also are able to separate quality from true productivity by using direct measures of health care quality; in particular, we use data on mortality rates from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.
We use data from the Health Care Provider Cost Reports, which are a set of facility level data files on the universe of Medicare-certified institutional providers from 1996 to
2009. This dataset is ideal for our study for two main reasons. First, it comprises 95 percent of all the hospitals in the US and has information on every state, county and referral region, making it representative of the entire hospital system in the US. 7 Second, this data set has information on every input each hospital uses in day to day activities, including high-quality information on capital and depreciation, labor (medical and non medical), materials (including drugs), and energy. In order to receive medicare reimbursements, providers are required to submit an annual cost report, containing information on facility characteristics, utilization data, cost, charges by cost center (in total and for Medicare),
Medicare settlement data, and financial statement data. The data are available for hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, renal facilities, home health agencies, and hospices. To our knowledge, no other data set contains this level and quality of information, which allows us to estimate a hospital production function in the US.
Our results show that (i) the contribution of true productivity growth to revenue growth (whose correlation with cost growth is 0.9) is about 25 percent on average between 1996 and 2009, (ii) the contribution of better health outcomes (higher quality) is about 5 6 Although productivity measurement has a long tradition in the economic literature, two problems plague these estimates. The first is the endogeneity of productivity to the input factor choice. This problem arises because the choice of production factors is not independent of the productivity level, introducing biases in the estimated parameters. The second problem is the lack of data on individual quantities and prices: when these elements are not observed, productivity estimates cannot distinguish between true productivity and demand or price variation.See for example Klette and Griliches (1996) and more recently Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) .De Loecker (2011) uses this method in the context of international trade. 7 We define later in the paper Health Referral Regions and illustrate their importance in our identification of the effects of quality separate from productivity percent and (iii) the contribution of the production factors is 70 percent, with capital contributing 6 percent, labor contributing 8 percent, materials contributing 4 percent and drugs contributing 52 percent.
If we define technology as it is commonly defined in the health cost growth literature, that is, by including capital investment and drugs in addition to the true productivity term, the contribution is very high, of about 82 percent. This is even larger than estimates suggested by previous studies. However, if we limit the definition of technology to true productivity, our estimate is much lower at 25 percent.
There is a temporal dimension to these gains as well. Our results show that the Within the same empirical procedure, we also estimate a large price-cost mark-up for the hospital sector in the U.S., which is consistent with earlier findings of a highly concentrated hospital market. This suggests that the large gains in efficiency we find have not been translated into lower prices for patients, but rather have been due to factors other than the production of health, like the payment systems.
Our analysis of the dynamics of productivity in the hospital sector shows that most productivity growth comes from within hospitals, with almost no contribution from net entry or reallocation of market share towards more productive hospitals. At the same time, true productivity shows a much larger dispersion than that of other sectors in the U.S. The relationship between our measure of true productivity and quality is positive, and true productivity is also positively related to spending. This complements our analysis and gives additional support to our interpretation of the data: hospitals are very efficient in delivering more medical services that are not necessarily related to quality.
Taken together, our results are consistent with the view that technology is the main driver of health cost growth in the US, but we go further this assertion and precisely qualify and quantify this statement. In a time series, increases in productivity and drugs are the main drivers of revenue growth, and they are part of a broad definition of technology.
At this point, it is important to emphasize that, according to our definition of output, gains in true productivity are gains in efficiency in delivering medical services, but they do not necessarily imply gains in health outcomes. In fact, our proxy measure for quality (adjusted mortality) grows slowly compared to true productivity. In a cross section, our results are also consistent with a health system in which true productivity, measured as the amount of medical services delivered given a determined amount of inputs, can vary greatly across regions but is not reflected in gains in quality (survival).
This paper makes several contributions to the measurement and understanding of the role of technology and productivity in the health care sector. First, to our knowledge we are the first to measure productivity separately from technology, as is commonly defined, for almost the complete universe of U.S. hospitals (as opposed to the measure in a single medical procedure or in a specific region). Second, we are the first to measure the role of different input factors like capital, labor, medical supplies, drugs and energy in the hospital production function at the micro level and within a common framework. Having good measures of capital and materials, afforded to us by the HCRIS data, is crucial to understanding how much of "unexplained growth" in health costs is truly unexplained, rather than coming from growth in the costs of drugs or machines (like MRIs). Third, we can separately identify the contribution of factor growth, productivity growth and quality growth to the rise of health costs in U.S. hospitals. Fourth, we estimate the returns to scale for the US hospitals, a key input when analyzing the impact of mergers and prices. Fifth, we are able to estimate within this framework the elasticity of demand for hospital care and therefore the Lerner index in the US hospital industry. Finally, we further document the large dispersion in productivity across U.S. hospitals and provide evidence that productivity growth comes mainly from within US hospitals and not from a reallocation process. This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the literature that investigates the role of technology in health care cost growth. Newhouse Our results are also consistent with Chandra and Skinner (2012) , who pose that a mix of moral hazard and principal agent is the cause of rapid cost growth in the U.S. health system. That is, because insurance is the primary payor, more services are offered and there is an incentive to increase the use of new technologies, which may or may not be worth the price. They propose a model in which health care productivity, measured in terms of health output, depends on the heterogeneity of treatment effects across patients, the shape of the health production function and the cost structure of different procedures.
Although our measure of productivity depends on medical services and not on health outputs, our results fit their basic story, which also fits the description by Horwitz and Nichols (2009) , who provide evidence that at least some non-profit hospitals maximize output, while all others maximize profits. This paper also contributes to the literature that estimates production functions in the health care sector. Some authors have estimated production functions for physicians (Reinhardt (1972) ) or cost functions for hospitals (Vita (1990) 
Output and Input Measures
Triplett (2013) describes two parallel ways of measuring output in health care. The first measure of output is medical care, which is a function of production factors (capital, labor, energy, medical supplies and drugs) and productivity, which accounts for all inputs that had not been accounted for or not fully measured. The alternative measure of output is health itself, which is a function of medical care, time, R&D and individual behaviors.
The problem with this measure is that health depends on many other factors different from medical services. In order to measure the productivity of medical services to produce health we would have to account for all the determinants of health to isolate the specific spending on medical services ( genetics, exercise, diet, lifestyle, etc). In addition, Triplett argues that although measuring medical care output by health outcomes is appealing, it has the potential of mixing production and productivity measurement in the health care sector with the measurement of the determinants of health.
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We measure output as medical services. We think that revenues reflect variation in the level of medical services produced by a hospital. Specifically, our measure of hospital 10 Triplett (2001) makes the analogy of the health production process with the production function of car repairs. In the national accounts, output in the car repair sector is given by the quantity of repairs, which in theory can be adjusted for the quality of repairs. In the health care sector, however, this quality plays a much more important role in the measurement, and the price paid for medical procedures do not necessarily translate in better outcomes.
revenues is hospital charges excluding contractual discounts (i.e. list prices). Because prices are included in the revenue measures, we must add a procedure to control for those prices and to determine the associated markup. We will come back to this point in the next section.
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Labor is measured as the number of full time equivalent employees. Energy is measured by the reported annual costs dedicated to plant operations, which include the maintenance and service of utility systems such as heat, light, water, air conditioning and air treatment.
Materials are measured as the sum of charges to patients and non-patients for medical and surgical supplies. Drugs are measured as the charges to patients and non-patients for medical drugs.
One of the most important advantages of our data set is that it allows us to construct very precise measures of capital stock by each individual hospital. Capital is constructed directly from the cost reports using a perpetual inventory method. Hospitals report capital balances at the beginning and at the end of the fiscal year, and also report acquisitions, disposals and retirements and depreciation. To start the series, in the initial period we have:
where K it0 and K it0−1 are the book values of capital for each hospital i at the beginning and at the end of the period calculated as the sum of beginning balances, purchases and donations less disposals, fully depreciated, and P IN t is the implicit deflator for capital formation from the BEA. The series for capital is created as follows:
Here, I it represents investment and is calculated based on the sum of purchases, donations, and retirement of new and old capital, as defined in the HCRIS cost reports, and δ it is the rate of depreciation for hospital i, calculated from the depreciation and capital
stock book values such that
11 Output activity includes the sum of total inpatient routine care services, ancillary services, outpatient services, home health agency, ambulance, outpatient rehabilitation providers, ASC, and hospice capital. The data set includes roughly 66000 observations from 1996 to 2009 from about 6000 hospitals. We drop observations with negative or zero inputs (565 observations) and observations with input grow of more or less than 1000 percent from one year to the next.
12 Table 1 Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) argue that mortality rates are not good measures of hospital quality because "hospital admission is not random and some hospitals may attract patients with greater unobserved severity of illness than others". In our case, the aggregation of mortality by referral region homogenizes the measures of quality across regions such that the admissions in the referral regions depend on the geographical location in a wide sense and the severity of the patients is the same across regions. This, however, limits our analysis to a higher level of aggregation than the hospital level, which, in turn, poses some additional challenges in terms of aggregation of revenues, outputs and inputs.
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We depart from previous analysis in our approach by directly measuring the production function of hospitals. To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate a production function for the universe of the U.S. hospitals using more traditionally defined economic outputs and inputs. This has some important advantages. First, by using revenues we capture a measure of activity that reflects the quantity of medical services delivered to the patients. This is possible in part because our estimation procedure captures variation in activity across hospitals that is independent of variation in prices and market power. Second, we have very detailed measures of economic inputs. In particular, the HCRIS data contains a precise measure of capital (equipment and structures) by hospital, something not common in earlier studies estimating production functions. This capital measure includes the detailed information that each hospital reports about investment and depreciation adjustments as explained in the previous section.
In estimating a hospital production function, we must handle several common problems including simultaneity and selection issues and biases due to the lack of data on individual prices. More specifically, simultaneity problems arise because the choice of production factors is correlated with unobserved productivity, present in the residual term, and selection issues are generated by the entry and exit of hospitals. Moreover, while individual prices are very rarely observed, this is even more true in the health sector. When the econometrician does not control for unobserved individual prices, a bias arises, leading to a confusion between productivity and quality. We will explain this point in more detail later in the same lines as Griliches and Kettle (1996) and Foster et al. (2008), among others. Finally, when quality is unobserved, as is the case in the hospital sector, this further complicates the identification of true productivity.
We use the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) to control for simultaneity and selection problems, the method proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996) to address unobserved individual prices, and we use proxy measures of quality to separately identify the true productivity term.
Consider hospital i that earns revenue, R it , in period t as the result of the production of some amount of medical services Q it . Hospital i uses a vector of factors
it in the production of medical services. Here K it represents capital, L it represents labor, E it represents energy, M it represents materials, and D it represents drugs. Moreover hospital i has a true productivity level of ω it . We use a
Cobb-Douglas production function to express this relationship such that:
In this equation, u it is an iid disturbance representing measurement error and idiosyncratic shocks to production. In logs, with lower case letters representing the logs of the variables:
Estimates of this equation are biased because of the simultaneity between true productivity and input choices. For example, a hospital's choice of the number of nurses and doctors depends on how well those nurses or doctors are able to attend all patients at a given time. If they are very efficient (productive) they would use fewer nurses and doctors. Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a solution to this problem noting that if the function that links measured productivity to investment is invertible, the econometrician can use the observed investment to recover the measured productivity shocks. We use this by assuming that investment has a monotonically increasing relationship with true productivity.
Formally, investment is the solution to a dynamic programming problem in which true productivity is a state variable. The policy function is given by:
If investment is a monotonically increasing function of true productivity, we can invert this policy function to get true productivity as a function of observable variables on the part of the econometrician,
This relationship allows us to correct for the simultaneity bias between production inputs and productivity. Further, the Olley and Pakes methodology corrects for the selection bias that occurs if the entry or exit decision of a hospital is based on a productivity shock that depends upon its size. This is, larger firms are less likely to exit in response to a small productivity shock when compared to smaller firms. and revenue R it , we could calculate the quantity of medical services as
. The log transformation of the Cobb-Douglas production function that we assumed before more clearly reveals the bias induced by the unobserved individual prices by using Eq. (4) to substitute for q it :
Instead of the individual price level, p it , we can only observe the aggregate price index of the industry P It , leading to the following estimating equation:
Following Klette and Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2011), we use a standard hori-zontally differentiated product demand system to control for the lack of price information at the individual level:
where η is the constant elasticity of demand, χ it is hospital quality, and v it represents iid demand shocks. In addition, we make the assumption that the hospital market is monopolistically competitive. This assumption is both due to convenience and to the fact that it describes "tolerably well", as Dranove and Satterthwite (2000) argue, the market for most health services. As in Klette and Griliches (1996) 
where β j = η+1 η α j , η is the average price elasticity of demand across hospitals,
X it represents the group of factor to consider, which in this case is X = k, l, e, m, d -capital labor, energy, materials and drugs-.
represents measured productivity, a term that combines both productivity and quality shocks. We additionally assume that investment has a monotonically increasing relationship with both true productivity and quality, and that they can be combined in a single term in the estimation. 16 Because of this, we do not directly estimate the quality component in the Olley and Pakes procedure. Instead, we decompose the measured productivity into true productivity and quality from the estimated residual using a separate estimator.
This estimating equation highlights the biases introduced when the econometrician cannot observe individual prices. In particular, the marginal products of productive inputs must be rescaled by the elasticity of demand, the logged industry output, q It , must be included, and measured productivity term,ω it , now includes hospital quality.
Fortunately, the only change in the Olley and Pakes procedure is the inclusion of industry quantity, which we measure using aggregate deflated revenues as a proxy for industry output. Table 2 shows the results of several specifications of the production function estimated at the hospital level. Columns (1) through (3) show the results for a production function that includes only capital and labor (KL). Columns (4) through (6) show the results for a production function including capital, labor, energy, medical supplies and drugs (KLEMD) production function. Each production function specification is analyzed using index. Klette and Griliches show that using an industry wide deflator tends to create a downward bias in the scale estimate and this bias decreases with an increase in the elasticity of demand. Because the omitted price bias goes against the bias created by the endogeneity of inputs and productivity, the final result is more an empirical question than a theoretical one.
Estimates of the Hospital Production Function
The KL specification in columns (1) to (3) shows clearly the biases that each estimator attempts to correct. By correcting for endogeneity, the OP estimator in column (2) produces a lower labor coefficient and a higher capital coefficient as is predicted by theory.
By correcting for the price bias, the estimator in column (3) produces much higher coefficients for both labor and capital. This large increase in both coefficients suggest that in the hospital sector the price bias is much more important than the endogeneity bias. In addition, not accounting for prices would produce decreasing returns to scale, when the scale estimate is considerable higher than one and equal to 1.368. The implausible coefficient for labor when correcting for endogeneity and price bias suggest that estimating a production function using only those two factors can produce misleading results.
The problem with the KL specification in terms of estimating total factor productivity is that it imposes implausible restrictions in terms of the elasticity of output to energy, materials, and in this case, also drugs. For this reason, we estimate a KLEMD specification that includes capital, labor, energy, materials and drugs as inputs (as mentioned before, the inclusion of energy can help account for different levels of capital utilization, under the assumption that the latter is positively correlated with the use of energy).
Columns (4) to (6) show the results for the KLEMD specification. A specification that uses only capital and labor overestimates the contribution of those factors to the production of health. As expected, factor elasticities for capital and labor become smaller, as energy and materials are allowed to impact output in a nonlinear fashion. When correcting for endogeneity, the OP estimator in column (5) The US Department of Justice classifies a market as "highly concentrated" when the HHI exceeds 2,500.
We are able to identify the elasticity of hospital demand and the associated Lerner Index by including a CES demand system under monopolistic competition within the Olley-Pakes estimation framework to control for unobserved prices. Columns (3) and (6) show that the elasticity of demand is between -3.8 and -7. A possible explanation for the high elasticity that we estimate can be found in Dranove and Satterthwite (2002). They differentiate two types of demand in the health care markets under monopolistic competition: One demand curve determines the change in quantities demanded from an individual hospital i as it varies the price from an initial price p 0 , holding other hospital prices as fixed. The other demand curve determines the quantities demanded from this hospital when it moves prices in tandem with other hospitals, which describes the industry demand curve. They show that the individual demand curve is more elastic than the aggregate demand curve. We interpret our results as an estimate of the average individual demand curve, which have a much higher elasticity than the estimates of the industry demand curve present in previous studies.
We also estimate the production function at the HRR level for several reasons. First, in order to differentiate true productivity from quality, we need to use proxy measures of quality that are only available aggregated at the HRR level. Therefore, we estimate the contribution of true productivity and quality using two different methods for aggregation, one of which requires coefficients of the production function that are estimated at the HRR level of aggregation. And second, we explore the possibility that the high estimates of the elasticity of hospital demand when measured at hospital level do not hold when estimated at the HRR level because it is harder for patients to move from one region to another.
Before estimating the production function at the HRR level, we need to aggregate output and inputs because different factors may have different productivity. We measure aggregate output and inputs as the weighted sum of individual variables, using revenue shares as the weights. At the HRR level, we average the age of the firms and the number of exits per period by HRR to include in the Olley and Pakes procedure.
Estimates of the production function at the HRR level differ in several ways to the estimates at the hospital level (Table 3) . First, returns to scale are lower than the estimates at the hospital level, although they are still increasing when correcting for the price bias and endogeneity. Second, capital has a higher contribution to production in this case, while labor has a lower contribution, and the contribution of drugs is roughly stable. Finally, the estimate of the elasticity of hospital demand is lower, but nonetheless is still high relative to previous estimates. The estimated lower elasticity across regions suggests that markets show a certain degree of segmentation. Interestingly, all the age coefficients are positive and statistically significant, showing an important effect of age in the production function of hospitals at the HRR level. This may come from the individual effect of entry and exit decisions.
From the production function estimates for US hospitals, we can draw several important conclusions. First, capital and labor alone cannot determine the production function of US hospitals. Not considering other factors would allocate a disproportionate contribution of those factors. In particular, drugs seem to be very important in the production for health, with a share of more than 50 percent. Second, our results suggest increasing returns 
Production Factors' Contribution to Hospital Revenue Growth
Our goal is to estimate the contribution of each factor to total revenue growth. In order to do this, we use a growth accounting methodology following Solow (1957) . This well This table shows the contribution of each production factor to revenue in U.S. Hospitals. The decomposition uses the growth accounting method of Solow (1957) . It takes the production function coefficients estimated previously to weight the growth of each factor in their contribution to revenue.
known equation is:
In this equation, the contribution of factor X to revenue growth is given by α x ∆X X , and the contribution of productivity to revenue growth is ∆ω ω
. We can calculate this contribution for each hospital by using the estimated coefficients and the growth rates of all factors. Table 4 shows the average contribution of each factor to hospital revenue growth by year during the period of analysis (1997 to 2009).
The first thing to notice from Table 4 is that the average revenue growth between 1997 and 2009 is 4.5 percent, 2.1 percentage points above GDP growth during the same period. This is consistent with the excess cost growth literature for the US. The only period of negative revenue growth was during 2009, and here only labor and productivity contributed to the fall in revenue. This suggest that hospitals may have adjusted revenue in response to the recession through labor, and especially through productivity. The decrease in productivity during the recession year is consistent with the literature on procyclical productivity. As Basu and Fernald (2001) suggest, this may reflect variable utilization and resource allocation, meaning that hospitals reacted to decreased demand by providing fewer services with the same resources and shifting resources to other activities.
Overall, capital accounts for 6.2 percent of revenue growth, labor accounts for 8.2 percent, energy does not contribute on average, and medical supplies account for 4.0 percent.
Moreover, as Table 4 shows, the average contribution of capital, labor and medical supplies is relatively stable during the period of analysis. That the capital contribution does not vary much is expected because capital adjustments can take considerable time. Labor is relatively more volatile, but its contribution is also roughly stable. The same can be said about medical supplies. Energy contribution to revenue growth is highly variable, and the fall in energy usage might reflect a move towards using more energy efficient processes. However, on average it does not have any impact on revenue growth.
Drugs are the main contributor to revenue growth in the US during this period. On average, across time they account for more than half of total revenue growth in US hospitals. However, Table 4 percent. This result, however, may come from either gains in quality or gains in productive efficiency. We will discriminate those two sources next.
Decomposing Measured Productivity into Quality and True Productivity
We estimate the contribution of true productivity and quality to revenue growth by using a proxy variable for quality and the relationship derived in (10) between measured productivityω, true productivity ω and quality χ. We interpret our estimates of w as the true productivity measures, which indicates how better resources are used given constant quality of care.
The proxy we use for quality χ it is a measure that considers a transformation of the adjusted mortality rates in hospitals (by age, sex and race). Two points are worth emphasizing. First, as mentioned before, mortality is not a good measure of quality because some hospitals may attract patients with more difficult cases. If this is true, hospital admission is not random. Aggregating hospitals by Health Referral Regions (HRR) addresses this problem by homogenizing the severity of the treated cases by geographical location, but we have to face the issue of aggregation. And second, we estimate the contribution of quality outside of the Olley and Pakes procedure. As mentioned before, the Olley and Pakes procedure corrects the biases caused by the endogeneity between production factors and the unobserved productivity, which contains both the true productivity and the quality measures. Estimating the contribution of quality inside the Olley and Pakes procedure would not affect our results.
We use first a simple mean of the measured productivity across hospitals by Health
Referral Region to estimate the relationship between the measured productivity and the true productivity and quality. Recall that given our assumptions about the demand curve and the production function we have from the relationship derived in (10) that
In principle, we could use this expression directly to estimate the contribution of quality to measured productivity. We do not observe, however, direct measures of quality nor we have measures of true productivity. With our measured productivity, we disentangle the contribution of each term by regressing measured productivity on our proxy measure for quality. This is, we estimate the following relationship between measured productivity, true productivity and quality:
For each HRR h in period t, the true productivity component of Eqn. (12) is given by the sum of the time dummies, γ t , and the error term, κ t . The contribution of quality is given by γ χ χ ht . Our measure for quality, χ ht , is the inverse of the ASR mortality rate in HRR h at time t taken from the Dartmouth Atlas on Health Care. We choose the inverse to obtain a straightforward interpretation of the coefficient: the lower the mortality rate, the higher the quality. Data availability prevents us from estimating this equation for all periods for which we have information on hospitals. The Dartmouth Atlas only provides mortality rates from 1999 to 2007. For this reason, our estimate of the contribution of quality to revenue growth applies only to this period.
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The estimated coefficient for the inverse of the ASR adjusted mortality rate is 1.987
(std. 0.256). This value is close to the theoretical one of 1.15, which is equal to η η+1
. The difference may contain the measurement error in previous estimations.
We next incorporate this estimate of the contribution of quality and true productivity into the productivity accounting. Table 5 expands the productivity accounting equation to incorporate those terms, and Figure 1 shows the contribution of true productivity and quality to revenue growth by year. As Table 5 shows, quality accounts for 5 percent of total revenue growth. Much of what is driving the movement in the measured productivity comes from true productivity growth, accounting for 25 percent of total revenue growth.
Quality growth has contributed relatively little to revenue growth. Although our proxy for quality is a broad measure, our results suggest that revenue growth is not a reflection of large increases in the quality of health. Instead, revenue growth is a reflection of increases in efficiency, which has likely not been passed along to patients given the relative The sum of the contribution of pure productivity and quality is higher than the one estimated for the measured productivity for the period 1997 to 2009 because data availability only allows us to estimate it for the period 1999-2007 using about 60 percent of the complete dataset. The differences, however, are lower than 1%.
market power of hospitals in the industry. True productivity, however, has increased at an important rate especially after 2002, contributing almost as much as the growth in spending on drugs.
Those results are consistent with the observed pattern in the U.S. that health care spending is uncorrelated with outcomes across regions. At least in hospitals, our evidence suggest that spending has gone to more medical services that do no necessarily lead to better outcomes reflected in our measure of quality.
Using these estimates, we can define several measures of the contribution of technology to revenue growth. If we use the traditional economic definition, in which technology is associated with productivity, the contribution is 26 percent. However, we can include new machines and new drugs in the definition of technology. Using this definition, the contribution of technology growth jumps to represent 84 percent of revenue growth, with new drugs accounting for more than half this estimate. Compared with previous studies, this range is wider, but it is precisely defined in terms of production factors as productive efficiency, drugs and capital.
We also aggregate the measures of output,inputs and productivity by HRR as a robustness test and to acknowledge that the proxy measure for quality is at the HRR level. Results are also shown in Table 5 . To estimate the contribution and productivity by HRR, we use the coefficients of the production function estimated at the HRR level and the measures of inputs and outputs calculated at the HRR level. Those aggregated measures are the weighted sum of each output/input. The weights we use are revenue shares.
Consistent with the production function estimates at the HRR level, capital has a much higher contribution to revenue growth. The contribution of drugs, energy and medical supplies is also higher while the labor contribution is lower. True productivity and quality have a much lower contribution to overall revenue growth. One interpretation is that bigger hospitals have lower productivity, something that is confirmed in the data. We analyze the relationship between productivity reallocation and health care cost growth by investigating the contribution of the growth of productivity within hospitals, the contribution of net entry and the contribution of reallocation of production between hospitals. With this analysis, we can infer the contribution of each component to health care cost growth using the estimates we have obtained about the contribution of total productivity to health care cost growth.
We use two methods to analyze productivity reallocation in US hospitals. The first method is the one proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizian (2001), whose decomposition is given by:
where s et is the share of the hospital e in the hospital industry in period t, C are continuing hospitals, N are entering hospitals and X are exiting hospitals. As a measure of market share, we use revenue shares. Ω denotes industry-wide productivity, measured as the revenue-weighted sum of individual hospital productivities ω. The first term of the decomposition represents the change of productivity within hospitals not considering changes in market shares; the second term represent the change of productivity between hospitals, this is, the change in the market share multiplied by the deviation of its productivity from the average productivity in the industry, not accounting for changes in efficiency. The third term is a covariance-type term and equal to the change in productivity multiplied by the change in market share. The other terms represent the contribution of entering and exiting hospitals to total productivity by multiplying the difference of its productivity with the average productivity by its market share. In sum, the change in aggregate productivity is decomposed in changes due to productivity enhancements within hospitals, in changes due to reallocation across hospitals, in changes due to the interaction of changes in productivity and market share and in changes due to the differentiated productivity of entering and exiting hospitals.
The second method we use is the one proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) , which is given by:
In this decomposition,ω ands represent the cross-sectional unweighted mean of productivity and shares. The second term reflects whether production has gone to higher productivity firms in time, this is, if there is reallocation to more (or less) productive hospitals. This decomposition is less sensitive than the previous ones to measurement error and is less sensitive to the measurement of entry and exit.
According to the results shown in table 5, productivity growth within hospitals is the main contributor to aggregate productivity growth, as is the case in other sectors of the economy. Net entry, on the other hand, contributes almost nothing to productivity growth. Moreover, aggregate productivity growth is not driven by the allocation of activity to more productive hospitals, as it has been the case in other sectors of the economy. This explains why the results from the previous section about the productivity and quality growth in the health care sector do not change much with the method of aggregation, since productivity growth comes mainly from within hospitals and the reallocation term is small in comparison.
Our result that within productivity growth explains most of aggregate productivity growth in the hospital sector is consistent with the prevalent view about health care markets, in which the productivity differences across hospitals are given by idiosyncratic components. 20 In this view, health care markets are not easily affected by competitive forces and there is little scope for reallocation. A recent paper by Chandra et al. (2013) , however, argues for the opposite: productivity dispersion in the health care markets is not different from that of other sectors in the economy and it is subject to competitive forces that allocate market shares based on productivity. Although we obtain similar results when we follow their strategy, 21 they are not fully comparable to their results because we use a different measure of health care output, which implies they measure productivity of heart attacks, as opposed to the productivity of hospitals or the healthcare sector. We use a comprehensive dataset that includes nearly all hospitals in the U.S. and our study is not limited to one particular health procedure.
Dispersion in Hospital Productivity, Health Quality and Health Spending
Our previous analysis has implications for the relationship between hospital true productivity 22 , quality and health spending across U.S. regions. Given the large spending dispersion present in the health care sector as documented by the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, the natural question that follows is about its determinants. We explore in this section the correlation between health care spending, true productivity, and quality.
In this analysis, we take advantage of the fact that our measure of true productivity is not derived directly from the ratio of spending to outcomes in the health sector. We start by analyzing the dispersion in our measure of true productivity and quality. The difference of our analysis with previous research is that we are able to correlate spending and health outcomes with measures of productivity obtained independently from the simple ratio of spending to outcomes. Under that simple measure, a high productivity 22 In this section we refer to true productivity always. 
Conclusions
We have measured the contribution of capital, labor, energy, medical supplies, drugs, productivity and quality to revenue growth in the US hospital sector. Within a consistent framework, we were able to measure simultaneously the returns to scale and the market power of the hospital sector. As a byproduct, we also analyzed the sources of productivity growth and documented the large productivity dispersion across US hospitals. We based our estimation in a panel of 95 percent of the US hospitals spaning 19 years from 1996 to 2009, using a measure of medical services as output instead of health outcomes, which allows us to measure the productivity of hospitals in delivering medical services. Our results are consistent with the notion that the hospital sector has a considerable market power and has had large increases in efficiency in the last decade. This suggests that the increase in health care cost growth comes from factors unrelated to the production of health, like the payments system.
We observe increasing returns to scale in the US hospital sector. By controlling for individual prices using a demand system, we are able to account for the downward bias that this omission generates. In fact, without considering this fact, we observe constant or slightly decreasing returns to scale. This has important economic implications, particularly in merger analysis.
Our measured productivity growth comes mainly from within hospital reallocation.
Contrary to other sectors, net entry contributes little to aggregate productivity growth.
Reallocation between hospitals and reallocation of market shares to hospitals with higher productivity is not important. At the same time, our results show that productivity dispersion is much larger in the hospital sector than in other industries.
Finally, our analysis shows different geographical typologies of spending, productivity and quality that complement the alternative views about the relationship between spending and outcomes. In particular, by using measures of productivity for medical services in hospitals that are calculated independently of spending and outcomes, we can infer that allowing for the possibility of effectively cutting medical services that are not essential for the main treatment could lead to lower costs without lowering the quality of the treatments.
